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Do  lending  relationships  mitigate  credit  rationing?  Does  securitization  influence  the 
impact of lending relationships on credit rationing? If so, is its impact differently in 
normal periods versus crisis periods? This paper combines several unique data sets to 
address these questions. Employing a disequilibrium model to identify credit rationing, 
we  find  that  more  intense  lending  relationships,  measured  through  their  length  and 
lower  number,  considerable  improve  credit  supply  and  reduce  the  degree  of  credit 
rationing. In general, we find that a relationship with a bank that is more involved in 
securitization activities relaxes credit constraints in normal periods; however, it also 
increases credit rationing during crisis periods. Finally, we study the impact of different 
types of securitization – covered bonds and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) – on 
credit rationing. While both types of securitization reduce credit rationing in normal 
periods,  the  issuance  of  MBS  by  a  firm’s  main  bank  aggravates  these  firm’s  credit 
rationing in crisis periods. 
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1. Introduction and motivation 
The global financial crisis of 2008/9 and the ensuing flight away from risk have 
affected credit flows towards various groups of firms to different degrees, depending on 
their size, location and risk features. Firms relying heavily on bank credit such as small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are particularly vulnerable to the credit crunch. 
At the same time, SMEs typically benefit from intense bank-firm relationships, which 
may help mitigating supply side effects stemming from shocks to the banking system. 
We  study  whether  intense  bank-firm  relationships  help  in  reducing  credit  rationing. 
Furthermore,  we  investigate  how  securitization  and  shocks  to  the  issuance  of 
securitization affect firms’ financing constraints during normal periods and during crisis 
periods. The 2008/9 worldwide financial crisis provides an opportunity to study the role 
of lending relationships and these banks’ involvedness in securitization activities on the 
degree of credit rationing.   
In this paper, we test three different hypotheses combining several unique data 
sets on Spanish firms. First, do more intense lending relationships help firms to be less 
financially constrained? That is, even in normal times, lending relationships can help 
firms  to  be  less  financially  constrained.  Petersen  and  Rajan  (1994)  were  the  first 
investigating this question using data on firms’ reliance on trade credit. They found that 
firms with longer bank-firm relationships were less likely to employ costly trade credit. 
We test this first hypothesis employing a disequilibrium model (see Maddala (1980) for 
the introduction of this model; or Carbó et al. (2009) for an application to finance), as 
recently  the  assumption  that  trade  credit  is  more  costly  than  bank  credit  has  been 
subjected to criticism (Burkart et al. (2011)). Second, we investigate whether positive 
liquidity shocks due to a greater issuance of securitized assets and negative liquidity 
shocks due to  a drying  up of these markets,  as well as shocks to the  health of the   3
banking system generate a supply effect. The bank lending channel would imply that 
firms borrowing from banks subject to a larger shock to their financial health face larger 
financing constraints than otherwise similar firms. Finally, we address whether firms 
with more intense bank-firm relationships are better hedged against this supply side 
effect than otherwise similar firms.   
These questions are of great concern to governments as SMEs are the backbone 
of OECD economies accounting for up to 97% of all firms, between 40 and 60% of 
GDP,  and  up  to  70%  of  employment  (and  even  higher  percentages  in  non  OECD 
countries).  Our  results  are  relevant  for  both  practitioners  and  policy  makers.  For 
example, our insights may help in designing financial regulation on bank liquidity in 
order to dampen the impact on firm credit rationing.   
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, firms with a more intense 
lending relationship as measured through its length and lower number of banks they are 
dealing with, enjoy a greater credit supply and lower degree of credit rationing. These 
results are in line with previous findings (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1994)) but we are 
employing a disequilibrium model. Second, firms whose main bank is more involved 
into securitization enjoy lower credit constraints in normal periods; however, they also 
face  increased  credit  rationing  during  crisis  periods.  This  shows  that  securitization 
generates supply effects which depend on whether we are in normal or crisis periods. 
Finally, we study heterogeneity within securitization activity by investigating the impact 
of  different  types  of  securitization  –  covered  bonds  and  mortgage-backed  securities 
(MBS) – on credit rationing. While both types of securitization reduce credit rationing 
in normal periods, a firm’s main bank issuing MBS aggravates credit rationing in crisis 
periods.   4
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. The first strand concerns the 
topic of securitization in normal times and crisis periods. Securitization may stimulate 
loan supply by increasing the liquidity of banks’ balance sheets (see e.g. Wagner and 
Marsh (2006) or Duffie (2007)) or improving a banks’ risk absorption capacity. During 
stress periods, however, banks relying on securitization may face additional liquidity 
problems or capital constraints reducing their willingness to provide loans.  
The empirical work on the causes for banks to participate in the securitization 
markets and the consequences of securitization on bank’s willingness to grant loans, and 
their screening and monitoring incentives is developing rapidly (see e.g. Dell’Ariccia et 
al. (2009); Mian and Sufi (2009); Keys et al. (2010), or Panetta and Pozzolo (2010)). 
Initial empirical work on how loan sales impact lending relationships show that selling 
of loans does not hamper the bank-firm relationship (e.g. Drucker and Puri (2009)). 
Hirtle (2007) studies the use of credit derivatives and finds that these enhance a bank’s 
loan supply. Our paper is closest related to recent empirical work on the impact of 
securitization on bank lending (see e.g. Goderis et al. (2007), Jiménez et al. (2010) or 
Carbó et al. (2011)). Goderis et al. (2007), for example, investigate the impact of a 
bank’s securitization activity on the aggregate loan growth of a bank’s portfolio. They 
find that banks who are active in securitization exhibit a larger loan growth than banks 
not being active in securitization. We improve upon their work as we employ bank-firm 
level lending relationship information and their main bank’s activity in securitization to 
study how securitization affects credit constraints at the firm level. Jiménez et al. (2010) 
employ detailed bank-firm level data from the Spanish credit registry. They find that 
banks with more securitizable assets make more loans  available to firms. However, 
there is a substantial crowding out effect taking place as this expansion crowds out bank 
loans from other banks within the same firm. They conclude that in general equilibrium,   5
the impact of securitization is close to zero due to the crowding out of existing bank 
credit. They develop a clever identification strategy to pin down the supply effect of 
securitization.  Their  identification  strategy  relies  on  employing  firm  fixed  effects  to 
absorb credit demand shocks, allowing comparing within the same firm the impact of 
bank credit supply shocks. This implies that they consider only firms with at least two 
bank relationships. This may be a restriction as many firms have one bank only and 
exactly  those  single  relationship  firms  may  be  the  ones  where  shocks  to  the  bank 
relationship are most cumbersome (see e.g. Degryse et al. (2011) showing that shocks 
stemming  from  bank  mergers  are  most  severe  for  single  relationship  firms).  Our 
approach is to estimate a disequilibrium model containing a loan demand, loan supply 
and transaction equation. This allows studying how securitization activity of the firm’s 
main bank impacts credit supply and credit rationing. We estimate the level of firm 
financing constraints and we find that a greater intensity of securitization by a firm’s 
main bank reduces credit constraints to a greater extent. Carbó et al. (2011) analyze the 
deterioration of credit quality in Spain considering rating changes in securitized deals. 
Their results suggest that loan growth significantly affects loan performance with a lag 
of at least two years while loan performance is found to explain rating changes with a 
lag of four quarters. They also find that although securitized products are supposed to 
ensure  remoteness  from  their  originating  bank,  bank  characteristics  (in  particular, 
observed  solvency,  cash  flow  generation  and  cost  efficiency)  affect  ratings 
considerably.  
A second strand of related papers addresses the question on how relationship 
banking affects credit availability in normal times and in crisis periods. Most studies 
find  that  relationship  borrowers  (longer  duration,  wider  scope,  fewer  banks, 
geographically close banks) have better access to credit. Petersen and Rajan (1994), for   6
example, find that firms with stronger relationships have a higher debt to assets ratio, 
and resort less often to trade credit. Cole (1998) reports that bank-firm relationships of 
more  than  3  years  already  have  a  large  impact  on  credit  availability.  Agarwal  and 
Hauswald (2010) find that relationship banking enhances credit availability when bank 
and  borrowers  interact  in  person  but  not  in  case  of  e-loans.  (For  a  comprehensive 
overview, see Degryse et al. (2009), their Table 4.9, Panel C).  Other papers study the 
impacts of bank distress on borrowing firms and the role of relationships. The closest to 
our work are recent papers that look into the question whether the US financial crisis 
spurred a supply side effect. Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2010), for example, employ loan 
application data at German savings banks in the period 2006-2008. They investigate 
whether savings banks which are exposed to shocks from Landesbanken (whom they 
own) stemming from the US, behave differently than non-exposed savings banks, i.e. 
who own Landesbanken without exposure to the US financial crisis. They find evidence 
for  a  supply  side  effect  in  that  the  affected  banks  reject  substantially  more  loan 
applications than non-affected banks. Furthermore, bank relationships mitigate supply 
side effects as firms with longer relationships are less likely to be rejected even when 
their savings bank is exposed to a financial shock. We contribute to this literature by 
investigating how a firm’s main bank’s previous access to additional liquidity impacts 
credit supply when the securitization market dries up.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section provides 
the  data  and  methodology.  Section  3  presents  the  results  of  our  analysis.  Section  4 
concludes.   7
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1. Data 
We  combine  different  data  sources  for  our  empirical  analysis.  The  primary 
source of firm-level information is the SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos) 
database by Bureau Van Dijk. SABI includes accounting and financial information on 
more than 700,000 Spanish firms since 1990.  Firms are included in the database when 
they have at least one employee. SABI includes information on headquarters’ location, 
date of constitution, firm industry, number of employees, legal form of the business, 
whether the firm is quoted on a stock exchange and, most importantly for our purposes, 
the name of the bank(s) with whom the firm operates. The information on bank-firm 
relationships  and  other  key  variables  is  only  available  for  a  smaller  set  of  firms. 
Furthermore, the SABI database is updated regularly such that some information such 
as the one on bank-firm relationships is overwritten. We resolve this issue by retrieving 
information  on  bank-firm  relationships  from  previous  versions  of  the  database.  Our 
final sample covers 56,752 firms over the period 1993-2008, which represents around 
7% of total firms in Spain on average over the sample period
1.  Due to entry and exit of 
the firms, the panel is unbalanced and the number of firm-year observations is 326,332. 
If  both  consolidated  and  non-consolidated  accounts  are  available,  we  choose  the 




2.2. Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology 
                                                 
1 All territories in Spain are represented with a coverage of at least 6% of total firms in each territory.    8
To structure our analysis, we develop a number of hypotheses to explore (i) how 
the intensity of lending relationships affect firm’s credit rationing before and during the 
crisis, and (ii) to study the role of different types of securitization (covered bonds versus 
MBS)  on  firms  with  intense  lending  relationships  before  and  during  the  crisis.  We 
formulate three hypotheses. 
Hypothesis  1:  Firms  with  more  intense  lending  relationships  (i.e.  longer 
duration,  larger  fraction  borrowed  from  banks,  fewer  relationships)  enjoy  a  greater 
credit supply. All else equal, these firms are less likely to be credit rationed. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms borrowing from banks issuing (to a greater degree) covered 
bonds  are  less  likely  to  be  credit  rationed  when  their  banks  are  subject  to  shocks 
affecting their financial health. 
Hypothesis 3: Firms borrowing from banks issuing (to a greater degree) MBS 
are  more  likely  to  become  credit  rationed  when  their  banks  are  subject  to  shocks 
affecting their financial health.  
Our first hypothesis stems from the literature on relationship banking arguing 
that firms with intense lending relationships face lower credit constraints (e.g. Petersen 
and  Rajan  (1994)).  The  second  and  third  hypotheses  are  based  on  the  differential 
characteristics of MBS and covered bonds – MBS allow issuers to transfer risk whereas 
covered bonds largely remain on the bank’s balance sheet (see also Carbó et al. (2011).  
The  test  of  the  three  hypotheses  requires  identifying  constrained  firms.  In  a 
seminal credit rationing paper, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that loan markets in the 
presence of asymmetric information can be frequently characterized by a disequilibrium 
status. Although some accounting ratios can be relevant indicators of firm financing 
constraints, it is also possible to infer lending demand and availability and to estimate 
the probability of credit rationing from a disequilibrium model. From an econometric   9
point  of  view,  the  main  challenge  associated  with  estimating  the  market  model  in 
disequilibrium is that one has to obtain estimators for the parameters of loan supply and 
demand functions using only observed volume of transactions in the loan market. As 
demand and supply for bank loans are not observed (see however Cheng and Degryse 
(2010), or Kirschenmann (2010)), a disequilibrium model can solve this problem, by 
assigning the observations either to the demand or the supply equation. Maddala and 
Nelson (1974) discuss the appropriate maximum likelihood method for this class of 
disequilibrium models, which has been used for empirical analysis of credit markets in 
different countries (see e.g. Sealey (1979); Perez (1998), Ogawa and Suzuki (2000); 
Atanasova and Wilson (2004); Steijvers (2008), or Carbó et al. (2009)). 
We set up a model of bank loan demand by individual firms, allowing for the 
possibility that the firms cannot borrow as much as they would like. We follow Carbó et 
al. (2009) to measure constrained versus unconstrained firms; however, we augment 
their  model  to  incorporate  the  role  of  lending  relationships  and  the  securitization 
activity of the main bank holding a relationship with the firm.  A disequilibrium model 
with unknown sample separation, as described by Maddala (1980), is employed. The 
basic structure of the model consists of two reduced-form equations: a desired demand 
equation for bank loans and an availability equation that reflects the maximum amount 
of  loans  that  banks  are  willing  to  lend  on  a  collateral  basis.  A  third  equation  is  a 
transaction equation. In this model, the realized loan outstanding is determined by the 
minimum  of  desired  level  and  ceiling.  The  loan  demand  (
d
it Loan ),  the  maximum 
amount of credit available (
s
it Loan ) and the transaction equation ( it Loan ) of firm i in 
period t are: 
0 1 2 3 4 b b b b b = + + + + +
d d d d d d d d
it it it it it it Loan Activity Size Substitutes Cost u     (1) 
0 1 2  
s s s s s
it it it it Loan Collateral Default risk u b b b = + + +          (2)   10
( , ) =
d s
it it it Loan Min Loan Loan                 (3) 
The amount of bank credit demanded is modelled as a function of the level or 
the expansion of firm activity, firm size, other sources of capital that are substitutes to 
bank loans, and the cost of bank credit. The maximum amount of credit available to a 
firm  is  modelled  as  a  function  of  the  firm’s  collateral  and  default  risk.  All  level 
variables are expressed in terms of ratios to reduce heteroscedasticity. Thus, the size 
effect of “total assets” in the demand function above is estimated as part of the constant 
term, while the constant term is estimated as a coefficient of the reciprocal of total 
assets (the same logic is applied to the collateral effect of total assets and the constant 
term in the availability function). Firm activity is represented by the level of sales over 
the one-year lagged total assets. Both firm production capacity (total assets) and sales 
are expected to increase (the level of) loan demand. Cash flow as a ratio of lagged total 
assets is used to control for the effect of substitute funds on the demand for bank loans 
and, therefore, the expected sign of this variable is negative. The cost of bank credit is 
expressed as the percentage point spread between the interest rate paid
2 by the firm and 
short-term prime rate and it is also expected to affect loan demand negatively
3.  
  In  the  availability  equation,  a  firm’s  “collateral”  is  proxied  by  the  ratio  of 
tangible fixed assets to lagged total assets and the expected sign is positive since the 
maximum amount supplied by a bank will increase with the level of collateral. We 
assume  here  that  tangible  assets  are  taken  as  collateral  or,  if  not,  are  potentially 
attachable as collateral by the bank. We also include the age of the firm as a proxy of 
reputation and information availability on the firm. The Lerner index – the difference 
between banks’ prices and marginal costs divided by prices– is included as an indicator 
                                                 
2 The “interest paid” was computed from the income statement. We divided it by bank loans outstanding.  
We implicitly assume that the year-end loan balance is roughly equal to the weighted average balance 
during the year. 
3 Since interest rates are central in this model, loan prices were alternatively introduced in levels instead 
or relative to short-term prime rate. The results remain statistically unaltered.    11
of bank market power in the regions
4 where the firm operates. Firms’ default risk is 
measured by the ability to pay interest (proxied by the operating profit/interest ratio) 
and the ability to pay short-term debt (proxied by the current assets/current liabilities 
ratio). A high operating profit/interest ratio or a high current assets/current liabilities 
ratio indicates that the default risk is low. Therefore, the expected signs of the collateral 
variable and the variables that indicate the ability to pay interest and short term debt are 
all expected to be positive. Both demand and availability equations contain regional 
GDP (log(GDP)) to control for macroeconomic conditions across regional markets. 
  The simultaneous equations system in (1), (2) and (3) is estimated using full 
information maximum likelihood (FIML), as shown by Maddala and Nelson (1974). 
The  FIML  routine  employed  also  incorporates  fixed  firm  effects  to  account  for 
unobservable  firm-level  influences.  Based  upon  the  estimates  of  this  system  it  is 
possible  to  compute  the  probability  that  loan  demand  exceeds  credit  availability,  as 
shown in Gersovitz (1980) and, therefore, to classify the sample into constrained and 
unconstrained firms. Formally, a firm is defined as financially constrained in year t if 
the probability that the desired amount of bank credit in year t exceeds the maximum 
amount of credit available in the same year is greater than 0.5. Hence, the probability 
that firm will face a financial constraint in year t is derived as follows: 
Pr( ) Pr( )
d d s s
d s d d d s s s it it
it it it it it it
X X





> = + > + = F 
 
    (4) 
where 
d
it X  and 
s
it X  denote the variables that determine a firm’s loan demand and the 
maximum  amount  of  credit  available  to  a  firm,  respectively.  The  error  terms  are 
assumed to be distributed normally,
2 var( )
d s
it it u u s = -  , and  F (.) is a standard normal 
                                                 
4 See Table 1 for a detailed definition on how the Lerner index is computed for banks operating in various 
regions.   12
distribution  function.  Since ( )
d d d
it it E loan X b =   and  ( )
s s s
it it E loan X b = , 
Pr( ) 0.5
d s
it it loan loan > > , if and only if  ( ) ( )
d s
it it E loan E loan > . 
Testing Hypothesis 1 implies adding bank-firm lending relationship variables to 
the Bank Loan supply equation (2). We include three indicators capturing the strength 
of  a  bank-firm  relationship.  In  particular,  we  add  the  length  of  the  relationship  –
measured as the number of years of the relationship between the firm and its main bank 
(we assume the main bank is either the only bank working with the firm or the bank 
with the longest relationship); a dummy variable showing whether the firm has a single 
(0) or multiple (1) bank relationships and an interaction term of the lagged collateral 
variable (tangible fixed assets/total assets) times the length of the relationship trying to 
capture the impact of the length of the bank-firm relationship on the value of asset 
tangibility as collateral.  
Similarly,  testing  Hypotheses  2  and  3  requires  adding  variables  regarding 
different types of securitization to the loan supply equation. In particular, we include for 
each firm the main bank’s issuance of MBS in a given year as a ratio of this bank’s total 
loans at the beginning of that period, the main bank issuance of covered bonds in a 
given year as a ratio of total loans at the beginning of the period, the main bank size (as 
a proxy for the presence of that bank in debt and capital markets) and the main bank 
cost-to-income ratio (as a proxy for the efficiency of the bank that may also influence its 
ability to lend at a lower cost). In order to capture whether the relationship between 
MBS and covered bonds issuance and loan supply varied during the crisis years, we also 
include an interaction term between each one of the securitization issuance variables 
and  a  time  dummy  taking  the  value  1  for  2007  and  2008  and  zero  otherwise.  An 
additional specification also considers a dummy which takes the value 1 for 2008 (when 
the crisis was more developed) and zero otherwise.   13
  The definition and sources for our main variables are shown in Table 1; their 
descriptive statistics are in Table 2. The data show that the average duration of the bank-
firm relationship is 6.6 years. Additionally, 49% of the firms work with a single bank. 
As for the issuance of securities by the main bank, 13% of the loans over the period are 
securitized as MBS while 17% are securitized as covered bonds in our sample. 
 
  2.3. Spain as an empirical laboratory 
Spain offers a particularly advantageous environment in which to analyze our 
hypotheses. Spain has a banking-oriented financial system with a large fraction of its 
economic  activity  driven  by  the  small  and  medium-sized  firms  which  are  highly 
dependent  on  bank  credit  and  the  most  likely  to  be  credit  rationed.  In  2008  SMEs 
represent 99.6% of the total number of firms and 53% of total employment in Spain. 
Spain is also a relatively attractive environment to study relationship lending because 
Spanish banks may focus more on relationship lending than in some other countries, 
particularly the U.S. For example, in the U.S. lenders historically had more transactions-
based lending technologies such as small business credit scoring that can also be used in 
lending to opaque firms.  
Another important feature that makes the Spanish case a particularly interesting 
one is the role of the lending cycle and securitization before and during the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008. Spain has featured in a particularly prominent fashion in the current 
crisis  attracting  a  big  deal  of  international  attention.  Securitization  activity  grew 
spectacularly in this country in parallel with large increases in bank credit to the private 
sector. Indeed Spain has been largely labeled as a country where securitization activity 
grew from being almost insignificant in the late 1990’s to finance a large portion of 
bank lending to the private sector in the years running up to the crisis. As shown in   14
Figure  1,  lending  to  firms  in  Spain  varies  significantly  over  the  business  cycle.  In 
particular, the yearly lending growth rates at the beginning of our sample period in 1996 
were  4.9%.  Lending  to  firms  increased  significantly  in  the  years  prior  to  the  crisis 
reaching 30.1% in November 2006 and falling sharply afterwards to 6.8% in December 
2008. 
On the back of an exceptional growth in bank credit the country also recorded a 
large rise in private sector debt. As in many episodes of banking problems across the 
world,  the  spectacular  upward  swing  in  the  Spanish  credit  cycle  was  buttressed  by 
particularly loose lending practices and large increases in housing prices (see Tornell 
and  Westermann,  2002,  and  Reinhart  and  Rogoff,  2009).  Hence  the  recent  Spanish 
episode of financial instability shares many common features with a large number of 
prior banking crises (i.e. large increases in loan growth coupled with housing bubbles). 
These features also emerged together with new factors such as financial innovation in 
general and most significantly in securitization markets.  
Little has been said or explored on a possible role for securitization in triggering 
lending in countries that experienced a lending and housing bubble in the years before 
the  crisis.  On  the  latter,  housing  prices  in  the  years  prior  to  the  crisis  have  been 
particularly noticeable in some European countries, the UK, Ireland and Spain -where 
housing prices have increased by more than 180% only between 1997 and 2007- the 
largest growth among major industrialized countries.  
The evolution of securitization in recent years offers some relevant information 
on the magnitude of MBS and covered bonds securitization in Spain. According to the 
Securitization Industry and Financial Market Association (SIFMA) Spain was the third 
largest country in Europe in terms of outstanding MBS securitization with € 163.8 bln. 
Only the UK (€ 530.3 bln) and Netherlands (€188.9 bln) exhibit higher outstanding   15
MBS  values.  As  for  covered  bonds,  the  European  Covered  Bond  Council  (ECBC) 
reports that Spain was the second largest market of covered bonds in Europe with an 
outstanding  amount  of  Eur  352  bln,  after  Germany  (Eur  719.4  bln).  Given  the 
importance  of  securitization  in  Spain,  we  wonder  to  what  extent  those  banks  more 
active in MBS and covered bond issuance have altered their lending to firms thereby 
augmenting or mitigating credit rationing.  Furthermore, we investigate the effects of 
securitization during normal periods and during financial crisis. 
  Using Dealogic and AIAF data Figure 2 shows the stock of covered bonds and 
ABS
5 issued by Spanish commercial and savings banks from 1999 to 2008. Covered 
bond issuance by commercial banks increased from € 0.5 bln to € 112 bln in that period 
while in the case of savings banks the stock of covered bonds grew from € 0.7 bln to € 
135  bln.  As  for  ABS,  the  stock  at  commercial  banks  was  €  0.5  in  1999  and  it 
continuously increased to € 126 bln in 2008 while the change at commercial banks 
during the same period was from € 0.4 to € 134 bln.  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Baseline model 
The estimated parameters of the baseline disequilibrium model (equations (1)-
(3))  are  reported  in  column  I  of  Table  3.  The  top  panel  displays  the  result  for  the 
“demand for bank loans”. All the variables have the expected signs. As shown by the 
demand  equation  parameters,  a  1%  increase  in  sales  over  total  assets  augments  the 
desired demand of bank loans by 0.35% while a 1% increase in cash flow reduces loan 
demand  by  0.98%.  Additionally,  a  1%  increase  in  the  cost  of  funds  (loan  interest 
spread) is found to reduce the desired demand of bank loans by 1.16%.  
                                                 
5 ABS encompass MBS and some other forms of asset backed securities like consumer finance. There are 
no separate data available on MBS. However, we expect thatin Spain  more than 90% of ABS are MBS.   16
The middle panel of Table 3 displays the results for the “supply of bank loans”. 
As for the credit availability function, a 1% increase in collateral (measured by tangible 
fixed assets over total assets) increases the availability of loans by 1.32%. The age of 
the firm has a positive and significant impact on the supply of loans (the coefficient 
being 0.32) while a 1% increase in bank market power (Lerner index) has a negative 
impact  on  loan  supply  of  0.75%.  The  ratio  “current  assets/current  liabilities”  is  not 
significant. The log(GDP) has a positive and significant impact in both the loan demand 
and loan supply equations.  
  The estimation of the baseline model also reveals that 30.3% of the firms were 
constrained within our sample.  
     
  3.2. Relationship lending and credit rationing 
  Column II in Table 3 offers the first test on hypothesis 1. In particular, two 
dimensions of relationship lending – the length (number of years) of the relationship 
with the main bank and the dummy showing the single vs. multiple relationships – are 
added to the baseline model. Column II of Table 3 reveals that firms with a longer 
relationship  with  the  main  bank  obtain  a  larger  loan  supply  from  their  banks.  In 
particular a 1% increase in the length of the relationship increases the loan supply by 
0.14%. Additionally, it is shown that those firms having multiple bank relationships are 
less likely to obtain bank loans, a result that suggests that the link between the bank and 
the firm weakens with multiple bank relationships.  
  Column III in Table 3 investigates whether observed collateral values mitigate or 
strengthen  the  effects  of  the  length  of  the  relationship  on  loan  supply.  We  add  an 
interaction term between the asset tangibility variable and the length of the relationship 
variable. Both the length variable and the interaction terms are significant and positive   17
at  the  1%  level  which  suggests  that  both  collateral  value  and  the  length  of  the 
relationship are positive drivers of loan supply.  
Taking the estimates of column III in Table 3 as a reference, Figure 3 depicts the 
estimated  evolution  of  firm  financing  constraints  within  our  sample,  along  with  the 
average length of the relationships and the average percentage of firms having multiple 
vs. single relationships with banks. All the variables are adjusted to their mean in each 
year. Figure 2 shows that the percentage of constrained firms increased from 30.83% in 
2006 to 36.80% in 2008. During the same time period, the average length of lending 
relationships within our sample decreased from 7.12 to 6.53 years and the percentage of 
firms having relationships with multiple banks increased from 41.2% to 43.3%.  
 
  3.3. The role of securitization  
  Table 4 explores the role of banks’ activities for the two types of securitization 
we  study  both  for  normal  periods  and  during  crisis  periods.  In  particular  Table  4 
investigates the impact of banks’ activities in MBS and covered bonds on financing 
constraints. In this table, we extend the loan supply equation not only incorporating the 
characteristics of the lending relationship with the main bank but also to include the 
securitization activity of the firm’s main bank as well as other control variables of the 
characteristics of the firm’s main bank such as its size and efficiency. Column I in table 
4 shows that both the issuance of MBS and covered bonds (as a percent of total assets) 
at the beginning of the period has a positive impact on current lending to firms. The 
economic  impact  of  a  1  percentage  point  change  in  the  covered  bonds  issuance  is 
significantly  higher  than  the  impact  of  MBS  (coefficients  being  0.74  and  0.14 
respectively). This result suggest that covered bonds, which theoretically are meant to 
be liquidity generation devices,  have a higher impact on lending to firms than MBS   18
securitization,  which  theoretically  are  meant  to  be  risk  transferring  devices. 
Additionally, we find that the size of the main bank does not seem to have an impact on 
loan supply to firms while efficiency does have a positive impact (lower cost-to-income 
ratio)  on  loan  supply,  suggesting  that  reducing  operating  costs  affects  loan  supply 
positively.  
  Taking the results of column 1 in Table 3 as a reference, Figure 4 compares the 
percentage of constrained firms with the percentage of firms whose main banks issues 
MBS and covered bonds. While both MBS and covered bond issuance increase in the 
years  before  the  crisis  –in  parallel  to  a  decrease  in  firm  financing  constraints,  the 
percentage of firms whose main banks was issuing MBS increased from 65.27% to 
67.12% from 2006 to 2008 while the percentage of firms whose main bank was issuing 
covered bonds decreased from 68.32% to 57.47% in the same period.  
In  order  to  investigate  whether  MBS  and  covered  bond  issuance  had  a 
differential effect on loan supply during the crisis we interact the issuance variables 
with a time dummy taking the value 0 up to 2006 and 1 for 2007 and 2008. The results 
suggest that the issuance of MBS had a negative impact on loan supply during the crisis 
(the total impact during the crisis (-0.2317) is the sum of the two coefficients +0.1378 
and -0.3717) while covered bonds have a slightly higher positive effect during the crisis 
(the total impact during the crisis (0.7241) is the sum of the two coefficients 0.7115 and 
0.0126). This result suggests that while MBS may impact positively in loan supply, this 
effect may turn negative during the downside of the lending cycle. These results hold 
when we restrict our crisis dummy to include 2008 only (see Model III of Table 4)
6.  
 
                                                 
6 For expositional simplicity we only use the dummy that compares the 1993-2006 vs. 2007-2008 in the 
rest of the tables.    19
  3.4. Robustness check: the size of the firm, bank ownership and bank real 
estate exposure issues 
  The different specification of the disequilibrium model in Tables 3 and 4 seem to 
offer consistent values of the main posited variables, with little variation between them. 
Importantly, as shown for all the specifications, the coincidence in the classification of 
firms between the baseline model and the rest of specification is around 90%, which 
reinforces the robustness of the model to specification changes.  
  We finally estimate three additional specifications to check the robustness of the 
results to firm size, bank ownership and bank real estate exposure issues. As for firm 
size, we extend our model by including a dummy which takes the value zero if the firm 
is large and one if the firm is an SME. We consider that the firm is an SME if the 
number of employees is lower than 500. As for bank ownership, the idea is to check 
whether there are differences in loan supply to firms between commercial and savings 
banks. Savings banks in Spain are stakeholder-based firms and do not quote in stock 
markets  as  commercial  banks  do.  Additionally,  savings  banks  have  been  more 
specialized in traditional lending activities than commercial banks and are frequently 
tied  to  a  specific  territory.  Hence  savings  banks  are  more  likely  to  get  involved  in 
relationship lending. Due to their specialization, savings banks are also, in principle, 
more likely to securitize loans given that their loan growth has been higher than the loan 
growth of commercial banks in the years before the crisis. Even if both commercial 
banks and savings banks are subjected to the same supervision and regulation in Spain, 
the abovementioned differences in ownership and specialization may have resulted in 
different lending practices.  
We add these variables to the two first specifications discussed in Table 4. The 
results of these extended models are shown in Table 5, columns I and II. The findings   20
confirm that SMEs are more likely to be credit rationed since the coefficient of the 
dummy variable for firm size is negative and significant. As for bank ownership, we 
find that loan supply seem to be significantly higher at savings banks since the dummy 
exhibits a positive and significant sign.  
  We also wonder how the effects found for securitization depend upon specific 
bank  characteristics.  In  particular  we  wonder  whether  these  effects  are  significantly 
different at firms whose main bank exhibits a high vs. low liquidity and for firms whose 
main bank is a commercial vs. a savings bank. In order to undertake these tests, we 
interact the securitization variables with these dummies
7. As for the liquidity dummy, 
the variable takes the value 0 for those firms operating with a bank whose liquidity ratio 
(liquid assets/total assets) is below the median  of the sample and 1  for those firms 
operating with a bank whose liquidity ratio is over the median. The results are shown in 
Table 6. While the liquidity of the banks does not seem to affect the impact of covered 
bond securitization on loan supply, it has a positive and significant effect in the case of 
MBS.  This  result  suggests  that  positive  effect  of  securitization  on  loan  supply  is 
conditioned to the liquidity holdings of the lender while the positive effect of covered 
bond securitization on loan supply seems to be unconditional on the liquidity level of 
the  main  bank.  As  for  the  interaction  of  securitization  and  bank  ownership,  no 
differences are found for MBS securitization while covered bond securitization seems to 
have  a  more  significant  and  positive  effect  on  bank  loan  supply  at  savings  banks 
compared to commercial banks. 
  Finally, we test if banks with different exposure to the construction and real 
estate sector have a systematically different behaviour in what the relationship between 
lending  patterns  and  securitization  is  concerned.  As  noted  by  Jiménez  et  al.  (2010) 
                                                 
7 We also tested the interaction between the dummy showing single vs. multiple bank relationships and 
securitization but no significant differences were found.    21
Spain experienced a housing price bubble in the years before the financial crisis and this 
could have induced banks with higher exposure to the real estate and construction sector 
to securitize loans to a larger extent. Jiménez et al (2010) show that banks with more 
real estate loans as a fraction of their total loan portfolio lend to smaller firms that have 
more  tangible  assets  and  rely  on  longer  term  financing  so  that  loans  of  real-estate 
dependent banks are more likely to be collateralized and have longer maturity. We also 
consider the exposure to the real estate and construction sector by looking at the share 
of  loans  that  is  given  out  to  the  real  estate  sector  (residential,  commercial,  and 
construction).  Since  we  rely  on  publicly  available  data  from  annual  reports  and 
prudential information reports published yearly by the banks we could only observe this 
exposure  since  2000.  Our  tests  consists  of  re-running  our  baseline  model  shown  in 
Table 4 for two groups of firms: i) those working with banks below the median value of 
the exposure to real estate sector (low real estate exposure banks) at the beginning of the 
year; ii) and those working with banks over the median value of the exposure to real 
estate sector (high real estate exposure banks) at the beginning of the year. The results 
are  shown  in  Table  7,  including  in  the  last  column  a  variance-covariance  test  for 
differences between both groups. Although the coefficients of low and high real estate 
exposure  banks  achieve  the  same  signs  and  significance  there  are  some  statistical 
differences in the magnitude of the coefficients that are worth noting. In particular, the 
banks with a lower exposure to real estate assets show a significantly higher positive 
impact of the length of the relationship and single vs. multiple relationships on loan 
supply. Besides, the issuance of MBS and covered bonds have a significantly larger 
positive impact on loan supply for these low exposure banks and the positive (negative) 
effects of covered bonds (MBS) during crisis years is shown to be also larger (smaller) 
for banks with a lower exposure to real estate sector. Interestingly, the percentage of   22
constrained firms for the sub-sample of firms working with banks having a low real 
estate exposure is lower (28.55%) than in the sub-sample of firms having relationships 
with banks showing a larger exposure to real estate assets (32.28%). 
 
4. Conclusions  
The  pros  and  cons  of  securitization  are  hotly  debated.  In  this  paper  we 
investigate the role of securitization for credit rationing through its influence on lending 
relationships during normal and crisis periods. Employing a disequilibrium model, we 
first establish that firms with a more intense lending relationship as measured through 
its length and the lower number of banks they are dealing with, enjoy a greater credit 
supply and lower degree of credit rationing.  
Securitization  activity  of  the  firm’s  main  bank  helps  in  reducing  credit 
constraints.  Indeed,  firms  having  relationships  with  banks  being  more  involved  in 
securitization activities enjoy lower credit constraints in normal periods; however, they 
also face increased credit rationing during crisis periods. This shows that securitization 
generates supply effects which differ in normal and crisis periods. Finally, we show that 
there is heterogeneity within securitization. We do this by investigating the impact of 
different types of securitization – covered bonds and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
–  on  credit  rationing.  While  both  types  of  securitization  reduce  credit  rationing  in 
normal periods, the main bank issuance of MBS aggravates credit rationing in crisis 
periods. 
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TABLE 1.   DEFINITION OF THE MAIN POSITED VARIABLES 
  Definition  Source 
 Sales  Total sales during the year.  SABI 
 Cash flow 
Net income plus depreciation plus changes in deferred 
taxes.  SABI 
 Loan interest spread 
Difference  between  loan  interest  rates  and  interbank 
rates. The loan interest rate is computed as a ratio of 
loan  expenses  and  bank  loans  outstanding.    We 
implicitly  assume  that  the  year-end  loan  balance  is 
roughly equal to the weighted average balance during 








 Tangible assets 
Fixed  assets  on  firm’s  balance  sheet  (thousand  of 
euros). This is considered as proxy of collateral.  SABI 
Age of the firm  Number of years since the firm was created.  SABI 
 Lerner index  Ratio  “(price  of  total  assets  -  marginal  costs  of  total 
assets)/price”.  The  price  of  total  assets  is  directly 
computed  from  the  bank-level  auxiliary  data  as  the 
average  ratio  of  “bank  revenue/total  assets”  for  the 
banks operating in a given region using the distribution 
of  branches  of  banks  in  the  different  regions  as  the 
weighting factor.  Marginal costs are estimated from a 
translog cost function with a single output (total assets) 
and three inputs (deposits, labor and physical capital) 










 Default risk 
This risk variable is defined as the ratio of operating 
profits  to  interest  paid.  A  proxy  for  operating  risk 
showing how many times interest paid are covered by 
operating profits. 
SABI 
Length (n. years relationship)  Number  of  years  of  bank-firm  relationship  with  the 
main bank  SABI 
Single vs. multiple bank relationships 
A dummy that takes the value 0 if the relationship is 
just with one bank and 1 if it is with more than 1 bank.  SABI 
Main bank issue MBS (% loans) 
Main bank’s issuance of MBS in a given year as a ratio 
of this bank’s total loans at the beginning of the period.  Dealogic 
Main bank issue covered bonds (% 
loans) 
Main bank issuance of covered bonds in a given year as 
a ratio of total loans at the beginning of the period.  Dealogic 
Main bank size /(log total assets) 
Size  (total  assets)  of  the  bank  that  holds  the  main 










Main bank cost-to-income-ratio 
Efficiency (cost/income ratio) of the bank that holds the 



























TABLE 2.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (1993-2008) 
 
   
 
1993-1996  1997-2000  2001-2004  2005-2006  2007-2008  1993-2008  Std. 
dev. 
 
 Sales  13953,2  16632,5  17267,3  19718.4  16121.0  16287.3  5230.1   
 Cash flow  1326.3  1532.2  1639.6  1824.1  1653.4  1590.5  698.3   
 Loan interest spread  0.0168  0.0159  0.0141  0.0127  0.0125  0.0131  0.0089   
 GDP  45258  49223  53524  59599  57412  52228  14431.6   
 Tangible assets  1395.5  1458.4  1606.1  1892.5  1694.2  1539.6  394.7   
Age of the firm  10.12  10.26  10.54  11.31  10.88  10.53  6.3   
 Lerner index  0.2102  0.2304  0.2403  0.2419  0.2412  0.2488  0.1721   
 Default risk  3.14  3.84  3.04  5.42  5.23  4.12  2.1   
Length (n. years relationship)  6.25  6.43  6.59  6.87  6.71  6.60  3.44   
Single vs. multiple bank 
relationships 
0.53  0.51  0.50  0.48  0.44  0.49  0.48 
 
Main bank issue MBS (% loans)  0.0  0.06  0.11  0.14  0.11  0.13  0.05   
Main bank issue covered bonds 
(% loans) 
0.0  0.05  0.14  0.17  0.21  0.17  0.04 
 
Main bank size /(log total assets)  8.14  8.46  8.88  9.03  8.89  8.63  1.59   
Main bank cost-to-income-ratio  0.70  0.68  0.64  0.60  0.68  0.66  0,28   






TABLE 3. ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THE DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL. ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS: 
BASELINE MODEL AND RELATIONSHIP LENDING  (1993-2008)  
Switching regression model estimated by full information maximum likelihood (FIML) with firm fixed effects 
p-values in parenthesis 
Standard errors are clustered at the regional level 
  (I)  (II)  (III) 
 
Demand for bank loans  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Sales/total assets(t-1)  0.3526*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3728*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3243*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Cash-flow/total assets(t-1)  -0.9861*** 
(0.000)  0.06  -1.1106*** 
(0.000)  0.06  -0.8435*** 
(0.000)  0.07 
Loan interest spread  -1.1640*** 
(0.000)  0.03  -1.0563*** 
(0.000)  0.03  -1.0388*** 
(0.000)  0.03 
Log(GDP)  0.0147* 
(0.042)  0.01  0.0128** 
(0.015)  0.01  0.0131** 
(0.018)  0.01 
   
Supply of bank loans   
Tangible fixed assets/total assets(t-1)  1.3285*** 
(0.000)  0.01  1.1728*** 
(0.000)  0.01  -  - 
Age of the firm  0.3226*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.2989*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3125*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Banks’ market power (Lerner index)  -0.7523** 
(0.023)  0.01  -0.7088*** 
(0.03)  0.01  -0.7112** 
(0.007)  0..01 
Loan interest spread  1.2860*** 
(0.000)  0.05  1.1363*** 
(0.000)  0.04  1.0780*** 
(0.000)  0.05 
Default risk  0.0012 
(0.752)  0.02  0.0010 
(0.805)  0.01  0.0008 
(0.721)  0.01 
Log(GDP)  0.0662*** 
(0.002)  0.01  0.0798** 
(0.006)  0.01  -0.0693** 
(0.007)  0.01 
Extended supply: relationship lending             
Length (n. years relationship)  -  -  0.1480*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.1374*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Single vs. multiple bank relationships  -  -  -0.6928*** 
(0.001)  0.01  -0.6055*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Tangible fixed assets/total assets(t-1) X Length  -  -  -  -  1.2230*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
   
Reciprocal of total assets in the loan demand equation  389664.1*** 
(0.000)  1338.2  397351.1*** 
(0.000)  1356.2  384521.6*** 
(0.000)  1322.4 
Reciprocal of total assets in the loan supply equation  294386.6*** 
(0.000)  2577.3  297806.9*** 
(0.000)  2604.3  284020.2*** 
(0.000)  2523.6 
S.D. of the disturbance in demand equation  1.3215*** 
(0.000)  0.01  1.2843*** 
(0.000)  0.01  1.2082*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
S.D. of the disturbance in supply equation  0.3704*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3952*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.4228*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Correlation coefficient between both disturbances  0.5325*** 
(0.000)  0.04  0.5581*** 
(0.000)  0.04  0.5731*** 
(0.000)  0.04 
Log likelihood  169044  176320  172106.5 
Percentage of borrowing constrained firms  30.3%  28.4%  28.2% 
Coincidence in the classification of firms as constrained (relative 
to specification (I))  -  95.5%  95.4% 
Observations  326,332  326,332  326,332 
Number of firms  56,752  56,752  56,752 
 
*, **. *** : Statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively   28
 
TABLE 4. ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THE DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL.  ALTERNATIVE 
SPECIFICATIONS: RELATIONSHIP LENDING AND SECURITIZATION (1993-2008)  
Switching regression model estimated by full information maximum likelihood (FIML) with firm fixed effects 
p-values in parenthesis  (Standard errors are clustered at the regional level) 
  (I)  (II)  (III) 
 
Demand for bank loans  Coefficient  Std. 
Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error 
Sales/total assets(t-1)  0.3157*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3326*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3014*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Cash-flow/total assets(t-1)  -0.9632*** 
(0.000)  0.03  -0.9203*** 
(0.000)  0.06  -0.9046*** 
(0.000)  0.04 
Loan interest spread  -1.1408*** 
(0.000)  0.04  -1.1524*** 
(0.000)  0.03  -1.1237*** 
(0.000)  0.03 
Log(GDP)  0.0137** 
(0.044)  0.01  0.0120** 
(0.021)  0.01  0.0110** 
(0.031)  0.01 
Supply of bank loans 
Tangible fixed assets/total assets(t-1)  1.4435*** 
(0.000)  0.01  1.3269*** 
(0.000)  0.01  1.3418*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Age of the firm  0.3299*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3683*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3533** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Banks’ market power (Lerner index)  -0.7461** 
(0.027)  0.04  -0.7010*** 
(0.021)  0.01  -0.7146*** 
(0.023)  0.01 
Loan interest spread  1.0604*** 
(0.000)  0.05  1.4782*** 
(0.000)  0.04  1.4333*** 
(0.000)  0.04 
Default risk  0.0012 
(0.895)  0.00  0.0010 
(0.831)  0.00  0.0011 
(0.814)  0.00 
Log(GDP)  0.0723*** 
(0.001)  0.02  0.0802*** 
(0.001)  0.02  0.0865*** 
(0.001)  0.02 
Extended supply (I): relationship lending 
Length (n. years relationship)  0.1231*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.1126*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.1135*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Single vs. multiple bank relationships  -0.6424*** 
(0.001)  0.01  -0.6908*** 
(0.001)  0.01  -0.7032*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Tangible fixed assets/total assets(t-1) X Length  1.2350*** 
(0.001)  0.01  1.2122*** 
(0.001)  0.01  1.1255*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Extended supply (II): Main bank characteristics and securitization issues 
Main bank issuance of MBS (MBS issuance/total loans)t-1  0.1423** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.1398** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.1185** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Main bank issuance of covered bonds (covered bonds issuance over 
total loans)t-1 
0.7394*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.7115*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.6374*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Main bank issuance of MBS (MBS issuance/total loans)t-1 X Dummy 
(1993-2006 vs. 2007-2008)  -  -  -0.3711** 
(0.013)  0.01  -  - 
Main bank issuance of covered bonds (covered bonds issuance over 
total loans)t-1 X  Dummy (1993-2006 vs. 2007-2008)  -  -  0.0126** 
(0.030)  0.01  -  - 
Main bank issuance of MBS (MBS issuance/total loans)t-1 X Dummy 
(1993-2007 vs. 2008)  -  -  -  -  -0.3460** 
(0.010)  0.01 
Main bank issuance of covered bonds (covered bonds issuance over 
total loans)t-1   Dummy (1993-2007 vs.2008)  -  -  -  -  0.0128** 
(0.026)  0.01 
Main bank size  0.0132 
(0.153)  0.02  0.0152 
(0.206)  0.02  0.0149 
(0.211)  0.02 
Main bank cost-to-income ratio  -0.1937** 
(0.023)  0.01  -0.1844** 
(0.030)  0.01  -0.1725** 
(0.032)  0.01 
Reciprocal of total assets in the loan demand equation  369224.8*** 
(0.000)  1430.0  385663.2*** 
(0.000)  1314.5  372334.4*** 
(0.000)  1315.5 
Reciprocal of total assets in the loan supply equation  261360.3*** 
(0.000)  2287.6  272882.7*** 
(0.000)  2564.2  278266.5*** 
(0.000)  2544.8 
S.D. of the disturbance in demand equation  1.2793*** 
(0.000)  0.01  1.2346*** 
(0.000)  0.01  1.2367*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
S.D. of the disturbance in supply equation  0.3369*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3455*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3267*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Correlation coefficient between both disturbances  0.4593*** 
(0.000)  0.03  0.5286*** 
(0.000)  0.04  0.5124*** 
(0.000)  0.04 
Log likelihood  126920  152114  150130 
Percentage of borrowing constrained firms  29.18%  30.22%  30.20% 
Coincidence in the classification of firms as constrained (relative to 
specification (I))  89.1%  91.3 %  91.3 % 
Observations  326,332  326,332  326,332 
Number of firms  56,752  56,752  56,752 
*, **. *** : Statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively   29
 
TABLE 5. ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THE DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL. ROBUSTNESS TESTS: BANK 
OWNERSHIP AND FIRM SIZE (1993-2008)  
Switching regression model estimated by full information maximum likelihood (FIML) with firm fixed effects 
p-values in parenthesis 
Standard errors are clustered at the regional level 
  (I)  (II) 
 
Demand for bank loans  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Sales/total assets(t-1)  0.2257*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3526*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Cash-flow/total assets(t-1)  -0.9013*** 
(0.000)  0.03  -0.9267*** 
(0.000)  0.05 
Loan interest spread  -1.1102*** 
(0.000)  0.03  -1.1391*** 
(0.000)  0.04 
Log(GDP)  0.0148** 
(0.032)  0.01  0.0118** 
(0.026)  0.01 
   
Supply of bank loans   
Tangible fixed assets/total assets(t-1)  1.3251*** 
(0.000)  0.01  1.3543*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Age of the firm  0.3403*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3628*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Banks’ market power (Lerner index)  -0.7128** 
(0.016)  0.05  -0.6413*** 
(0.024)  0.01 
Loan interest spread  1.0256*** 
(0.000)  0.04  1.3357*** 
(0.000)  0.06 
Default risk  0.0015 
(0.884)  0.00  0.0017 
(0.785)  0.00 
Log(GDP)  0.0718*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.0826*** 
(0.001)  0.02 
Extended supply (I): relationship lending         
Length (n. years relationship)  0.1308*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.1149*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Single vs. multiple bank relationships  -0.6608*** 
(0.001)  0.01  -0.7135*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Tangible fixed assets/total assets(t-1) X Length  1.2432*** 
(0.001)  0.01  1.2219*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Extended supply (II): Main bank characteristic, securitization issues and firm size type         
Main bank issuance of MBS (MBS issuance/total loans)t-1  0.1458** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.1054** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Main bank issuance of covered bonds (covered bonds issuance over total loans)t-1  0.7012*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.5977*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Main bank issuance of MBS (MBS issuance/total loans)t-1 X Dummy (1993-2007 vs. 2007-
2008)  -  -  0.0117** 
(0.030)  0.01 
Main bank issuance of covered bonds (covered bonds issuance over total loans)t-1  X  
Dummy (1993-2006 vs. 2007-2008)  -  -  -0.3242** 
(0.013)  0.01 
Main bank size  0.0093 
(0.251)  0.02  0.0159 
(0.220)  0.01 
Main bank cost-to-income ratio  -0.1782** 
(0.020)  0.01  -0.1927** 
(0.032)  0.01 
Main bank (0: commercial bank; 1: savings bank)  0.0536** 
(0.013)  0.02  0.0481** 
(0.012)  0.02 
Type of firm (0: large firm; 1: SME)  -0.0884*** 
(0.003)  0.02  -0.0784*** 
(0.003)  0.02 
Reciprocal of total assets in the loan demand equation  360281.4*** 
(0.000)  1412.3  382632.1*** 
(0.000)  1320.4 
Reciprocal of total assets in the loan supply equation  251487.7*** 
(0.000)  2327.2  272612.5*** 
(0.000)  2537.9 
S.D. of the disturbance in demand equation  1.2234*** 
(0.000)  0.01  1.2570*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
S.D. of the disturbance in supply equation  0.3650*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3548*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Correlation coefficient between both disturbances  0.4671*** 
(0.000)  0.02  0.5081*** 
(0.000)  0.04 
Log likelihood  129288  154662 
Percentage of borrowing constrained firms  29.04%  30.14% 
Coincidence in the classification of firms as constrained (relative to specification (I))  88.7%  89.6 % 
Observations  326,332  326,332 
Number of firms  56,752  56,752 
*, **. *** : Statistically significant at 10%, %% and 1% level, respectively   30
TABLE 6. ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THE DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL. ROBUSTNESS TESTS: 
INTERACTION BETWEEN SECURITIZATION AND BANK CHARACTERISTICS (LIQUIDITY & OWNERSHIP) 
Switching regression model estimated by full information maximum likelihood (FIML) with firm fixed effects 
p-values in parenthesis 
Standard errors are clustered at the regional level 
  (I)  (II) 
 
Demand for bank loans  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Sales/total assets(t-1)  01635*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.2675*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Cash-flow/total assets(t-1)  -0.8453*** 
(0.000)  0.03  -0.9092*** 
(0.000)  0.05 
Loan interest spread  -1.0034*** 
(0.000)  0.03  -1.1326*** 
(0.000)  0.04 
Log(GDP)  0.0145** 
(0.030)  0.01  0.0115** 
(0.021)  0.01 
   
Supply of bank loans   
Tangible fixed assets/total assets(t-1)  1.2634*** 
(0.000)  0.01  1.3533*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Age of the firm  0.3103*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3127*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Banks’ market power (Lerner index)  -0.7270** 
(0.014)  0.05  -0.64661*** 
(0.020)  0.01 
Loan interest spread  1.0518*** 
(0.000)  0.04  1.3239*** 
(0.000)  0.06 
Default risk  0.0025 
(0.658)  0.00  0.0005 
(0.788)  0.00 
Log(GDP)  0.0744*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.0831*** 
(0.001)  0.02 
Extended supply (I): relationship lending         
Length (n. years relationship)  0.1385*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.1204*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Single vs. multiple bank relationships  -0.6952*** 
(0.001)  0.01  -0.7344*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Tangible fixed assets/total assets(t-1) X Length  1.1694*** 
(0.001)  0.01  1.208*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Extended supply (II): Main bank characteristic, securitization issues and firm size type         
Main bank issuance of MBS (MBS issuance/total loans)t-1  0.1394** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.1218** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Main bank issuance of covered bonds (covered bonds issuance over total loans)t-1  0.7135*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.6831*** 
(0.001)  0.01 
Main bank issuance of MBS (MBS issuance/total loans)t-1 X   Main bank liquidity  ratio 
dummy (0: low liquidity; 1: high liquidity) 
0.0118*** 
(0.001)  0.01  -  - 
Main bank issuance of covered bonds (covered bonds issuance over total loans)t-1  X  Main 
bank liquidity ratio dummy (0: low liquidity; 1: high liquidity) 
0.0631 
(0.186)  0.01  -  - 
Main bank issuance of MBS (MBS issuance/total loans)t-1 X   Main bank ownership (0: 
commercial bank; 1: savings bank)  -  -  0.0080 
(0.127)  0.06 
Main bank issuance of covered bonds (covered bonds issuance over total loans)t-1  X   Main 
bank ownership (0: commercial bank; 1: savings bank)  -  -  0.0836** 
(0.006)  0.01 
Main bank size  0.0081 
(0.328)  0.02  0.0114 
(0.274)  0.01 
Main bank cost-to-income ratio  -0.1657** 
(0.022)  0.01  -0.1628** 
(0.024)  0.01 
Type of firm (0: large firm; 1: SME)  -0.0915*** 
(0.004)  0.02  -0.0715*** 
(0.004)  0.02 
   
Reciprocal of total assets in the loan demand equation  361148.2*** 
(0.000)  1406.1  36150.0*** 
(0.000)  1294.7 
Reciprocal of total assets in the loan supply equation  250127.5*** 
(0.000)  2116.8  270279.4*** 
(0.000)  2602.4 
S.D. of the disturbance in demand equation  1.2654*** 
(0.000)  0.01  1.1851*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
S.D. of the disturbance in supply equation  0.3543*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3314*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Correlation coefficient between both disturbances  0.4705*** 
(0.000)  0.02  0.5104*** 
(0.000)  0.04 
Log likelihood  129634  154485 
Percentage of borrowing constrained firms  29.13%  30.14% 
Coincidence in the classification of firms as constrained (relative to specification (I))  88.5%  89.3 % 
Observations  326,332  326,332 
Number of firms  56,752  56,752 
*, **. *** : Statistically significant at 10%, %% and 1% level, respectively   31
 
 
TABLE 7. ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THE DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK: MAIN BANKS HAVING A LOW VS. HIGH REAL ESTATE 
EXPOSURE (2000-2008)  
Switching regression model estimated by full information maximum likelihood (FIML) with firm fixed effects 
p-values in parenthesis  (Standard errors are clustered at the regional level) 
   
  Low real estate 
exposure 
High real estate 
exposure  Coefficient 
differences (p-
values)   
Demand for bank loans  Coefficient  Std. 
Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error 
Sales/total assets(t-1)  0.3123*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.2819*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.012** 
Cash-flow/total assets(t-1)  -0.8862*** 
(0.000)  0.06  -0.9218*** 
(0.000)  0.04  0.121 
Loan interest spread  -1.1142*** 
(0.000)  0.03  -1.1375*** 
(0.000)  0.03  0.194 
Log(GDP)  0.0116** 
(0.021)  0.01  0.0104** 
(0.031)  0.01  0.079 
Supply of bank loans   
Tangible fixed assets/total assets(t-1)  1.1432*** 
(0.000)  0.01  1.4163*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.014** 
Age of the firm  0.3132*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3721** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.054* 
Banks’ market power (Lerner index)  -0.7157*** 
(0.024)  0.01  -0.7402*** 
(0.021)  0.01  0.683 
Loan interest spread  1.5543*** 
(0.000)  0.04  1.4089*** 
(0.000)  0.04  0.075* 
Default risk  0.0007 
(0.826)  0.00  0.0014 
(0.761)  0.00  0.143 
Log(GDP)  0.0694*** 
(0.001)  0.02  0.0677*** 
(0.001)  0.02  0.329 
Extended supply (I): relationship lending   
Length (n. years relationship)  0.1363*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.1012*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.024** 
Single vs. multiple bank relationships  -0.7423*** 
(0.001)  0.01  -0.6852*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.044** 
Tangible fixed assets/total assets(t-1) X Length  1.1832*** 
(0.001)  0.01  1.1014*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.078* 
Extended supply (II): Main bank characteristics and securitization issues   
Main bank issuance of MBS (MBS issuance/total loans)t-1  0.1533** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.1052** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.018** 
Main bank issuance of covered bonds (covered bonds issuance over 
total loans)t-1 
0.8227*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.6138*** 
(0.001)  0.01  0.006*** 
Main bank issuance of MBS (MBS issuance/total loans)t-1 X Dummy 
(1993-2006 vs. 2007-2008) 
-0.2359** 
(0.011)  0.01  -0.3602** 
(0.014)  0.01  0.012** 
Main bank issuance of covered bonds (covered bonds issuance over 
total loans)t-1 X  Dummy (1993-2006 vs. 2007-2008) 
0.0178** 
(0.031)  0.01  0.0120** 
(0.027)  0.01  0.010** 
Main bank size  0.0133 
(0.287)  0.02  0.0156 
(0.227)  0.02  0.443 
Main bank cost-to-income ratio  -0.1931** 
(0.025)  0.01  -0.1699** 
(0.031)  0.01  0.013** 
Reciprocal of total assets in the loan demand equation  383244.5*** 
(0.000)  1297.8  368553.3*** 
(0.000)  1390.2 
 
Reciprocal of total assets in the loan supply equation  265005.3*** 
(0.000)  2323.5  268210.3*** 
(0.000)  2656.4 
S.D. of the disturbance in demand equation  1.2654*** 
(0.000)  0.01  1.2280*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
S.D. of the disturbance in supply equation  0.3217*** 
(0.000)  0.01  0.3054*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Correlation coefficient between both disturbances  0.5039*** 
(0.000)  0.03  0.5265*** 
(0.000)  0.04 
Log likelihood  157358  152108 
Percentage of borrowing constrained firms  28.55%  32.28% 
Observations  219,543  219,543 
Number of firms  44,633  44,633 
*, **. *** : Statistically significant at 10%, %% and 1% level, respectively   32
 
FIGURE 1. LENDING TO FIRMS IN SPAIN (yearly growth rates) 
 
Source: Bank of Spain 
 
FIGURE 2. COVERED BONDS AND ABS SECURITIZATION IN SPAIN (1996-
2008) 
Stock data. Euro million. 
 
Source: Dealogic and AIAF (Asociación de Intermediarios de Activos Financieros)  
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FIGURE 3. CONSTRAINED FIRMS AND RELATIONSHIP LENDING 
 
Source: Own estimations from SABI and Bankscope data 
 
FIGURE 4. CONSTRAINED FIRMS AND SECURITIZATION 
 
Source: Own estimations from SABI and Bankscope data 